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DIVORCE: AGREEMENT OF PARTIES AS TO ALIMONY
The number of recent cases on record involving agreements of
parties in regard to alimony is an attestation that during the last
few decades they have become increasingly popular. Generally, it
may be said that courts favor them, and there are many reasons why
they should do so. Where marital difficulties are in existence and
reconciliation is not possible, a voluntary settlement of many of the
problems that beset the parties is a great aid to the courts. That the
parties have been able to reach some sensible and amicable agree-
ment must influence the court when it considers how often during
litigation of this kind the parties allow their unrestrained hate and
resentment to add to the delay and expense of the suit. An amicable
adjustment has much to recommend it, and many courts have given
judicial utterance to the encouragement of them. Typical of the
esteem in which the more modern courts hold them is this state-
ment:
"Marriage is the basis of orderly society. The pres-
ervation of the marital status is of the utmost impor-
tance to the community and should be jealously
guarded. Infortunately, in our present civilization, the
necessity for separation or divorce in certain instances
and oft-times the desire for freedom in other instances
have become forces of destruction to the marital status.
This condition must be recognized as a reality. It is in
the interest of society that, when the marriage rela-
tionship has been destroyed and the parties no longer
continue to cohabit, the termination of the marital re-
lationship be arranged between the husband and wife
in an orderly fair and equitable manner. Where hus-
band and wife have agreed to an orderly settlement of
their disputes and have entered into a written separa-
tion which on its face appears to be fair and equitable,
a court should hesitate to set aside such an agreement.
Orderly society in a sense has been preserved. The will
of the parties as expressed by their agreement should
be disturbed only where their agreement is repugnant to
justice as between them or contrary to the interest of
society in the form of the state "'
It would be well if the discussion could be concluded on this
pleasing note, but unfortunately this cannot be done, for all courts do
not hold the same opinion, particularly if the agreement concerns the
amount of alimony to be awarded the wife. If the parties in settling
their many difficulties, succeed in reaching a settlement as to ali-
mony, and this agreement comes before the court in a subsequent
suit for divorce, a conflict may arise between the wishes of the
parties and the discretion of the court on dissolution of the marital
res.
1Fales v. Fales, 160 Misc. Rep. 799, 290 N.Y. Supp. 655, 659
(1936).
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
The precise question presented by tins situation is, to what
extent, if at all, is a court of equity bound to sustain the wishes of
the parties to a divorce suit as to the amount of alimony determined
by them and expressed in a separation agreement?
From a study of the decisions on this point it was found that the
court might (1) consider it advisory to the discretion of the court,2
or (2) adopt it, if it is fair and reasonable
Perhaps the greater number of cases support the first view. All
cases wherein it is said that such agreements are evidential,' where a
recommendation' will be considered," and may be adopted or re-
jected, are of this type.
Such stipulations or agreements can not bind the court, it is said,
because the power to grant alimony is inherent in the procedure of
divorce,' an action over which the courts possess exclusive juris-
diction, and the parties cannot by agreement oust the court of juris-
diction to so award alimony. A contention that the subject of ali-
mony can be removed from the jurisdiction of the court by the
voluntary action of the parties is as untenable as a claim that they
could effectively agree upon a divorce and its terms. Alimony does
not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage."3 It is a status which the state is interested in maintaining
and in every action for divorce the state is therefore an interested
party. The state has deemed it to be contrary to the public interest
to permit the husband, if he is the wayward party, not only to bring
about the dissolution of the marriage but to escape the duty of sup-
port arising from marriage status as well. Therefore, while it is
true that by giving the parties an unrestricted right to make and
enforce an agreement as to alimony, none of these fundamental
'See notes 4, 5, 6, and 7 infra.
'Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927), Petty
v. Petty, 147 Kan. 342, 76 P 2d 850 (1938), Shaffer v Shaffer, 135
Kan. 35, 10 P 2d 17 (1932) Clark v Clark, 301 Ky. 682, 192 S.W 2d
968 (1946), Alderson v. Alderson, 247 Ky. 12, 56 S.W 2d 534 (1933),
Luttmer v. Luttmer, 143 Ky. 844, 137 S.W 777 (1911), Parsons v.
Parsons, 23 Ky L. Rep. 223, 62 S.W 719 (1901), North v North, 339
Mo. 1226, 100 S.W 2d 582 (1936).
'Lum v Lum, 138 N.J. Eq. 198, 47 A. 2d 555 (1946) Perry v.
Perry, - Tenn. - 192 S.W 2d 830 (1946), Brown v. Brown, 156
Tenn. 619, 4 S.W 2d 345 (1928).
'Jones v Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P 2d 222 (1943), Barraclough
v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 11 P 2d 792 (1941)
'Cahill v. Cahill, 316 Ill. App. 324, 45 N.E. 2d 69 (1942), Rine-
hart v. Rinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P 2d 390 (1938)
'Russell v Russell, 247 Ala. 284, 24 So. 2d 124 (1945), Herrick
v Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N.E. 820 (1925), Shoop v. Shoop, 58 S.D.
593, 237 N.W 904 (1931).
'Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75, 226 N.E. 701 (1929).
'Ibid.
" Audobon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 45 L. Ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct.
735 (1901).
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principles may be viblated, still there is always the chance that the
parties will act in abuse of them, and this possibility has induced m
the courts a cautious policy which is, responsible for the rules and
conditions with which they surround any agreement between the
parties as to alimony.'
The tendency of the later decisions seems to be toward adoption
of such agreements, if they are found fair and reasonable, the propo-
sition of the second category.
It is true that the court itself is the final arbiter as to the fairness
and reasonableness of the contract, and it may be argued that the
terms of alimony which are submitted to the court in the form of a
contract can not be considered to be more than, in substance, ad-
visory to its discretion.
But this argument is in the end unsatisfactory, because it is ap-
parent that the rule imposes more than advice upon the court. There
is a wide latitude wherein fairness and reasonableness reside, and
if the terms of the contract can be found within those bounds, the
court should be but little less than compelled to adopt the agreement.
There is a position to be taken in regard to these agreements
which as yet has been unmentioned. That would be to hold the
agreement unqualifiedly obligatory upon the court. Needless to say
there are no judicial decisions which support this view, although it
would be possible from a strictly contractual approach to reach such
a result. But whether the result would be desirable is another ques-
tion. There seems to be no escaping the fact that all such contracts
should be fair and reasonable. If the personal interest of the wife
were the sole consideration, it might well be argued that she should
be bound by her agreement, but there are considerations of public
concern present that militate against giving her this ability to irrev-
ocably consent to such a settlement of the duty of support. It is upon
the courts to enforce these considerations of public concern, and any
denial or abridgment of their supervisory powers is also a disavowal
of'the public's interest in the matter.
Considering the problem from a practical standpoint, few ob3ec-
tions can be made to the approach utilized in the second category.
'This problem of what effect to give to an agreement of the
parties as to alimony is not only raised at the time of the divorce,
but often, even years after the court has found the contract fair and
equitable and in its discretion adopted its terms as part of the decree,
a party will resist modification of the decree on the contention that
the court may not disregard an agreement between the parties which
at the time of divorce it had found fair and adequate. This argument
has found no support, for it is not the contract that the court is
modifying, but its own decree. This is one of the most potent reasons
why the terms of a contract as to the amount of alimony, if found by
the court to be just, should always be adopted by the decree, rather
than left to stand as a mere contract between the parties. The court
will never thereafter encounter any difficulty if a modification of it
is sought.
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It gives to the parties the greatest amount of freedom m contracting
consistent with the demand of the state for an interest in the sup-
port of the wife.
DOYLE B. INMAN
